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UNITED NATIONS REORGANIZATION

by

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UNITED NATIONS REORGANIZATION

SOON AFTER the United Nations General Assembly convenes on September 19, either Secretary of State Dean Rusk or President Kennedy himself will lay before the members the position of the United States on Berlin, nuclear testing and other urgent questions. The purpose will be to make this country's views clear to all who listen, within the chamber and beyond, and of course to gain as wide support as possible.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, however, will look to the United Nations to settle the conflicts now dangerously dividing East and West. At the founding of the world organization in 1945, the great powers, the United States included, were unwilling to assume the burden of keeping peace between nations without retaining a controlling voice over use of their military forces for that task. Hence the power of veto was accorded the permanent members of the Security Council and ordering of United Nations action to restrain an aggressor became dependent on unanimity among the great powers. Only the uncertain sanction of world public opinion remained to hold in line the great powers themselves.

COMING ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON U.N. STRUCTURE

As things have worked out, there has been a conspicuous lack of unanimity among those powers, and the Soviet Union's free use of the veto has virtually paralyzed the Security Council. This situation long ago gave rise to demands for revision of the Charter to restrict resort to the veto. Moscow has resisted all such demands. During the past year, moreover, it has been campaigning for a reorganization of the U.N. Secretariat that would impose the principle of unanimity on the executive arm of the world organization and enable dissenters to obstruct the carrying out of mandates of the General Assembly. It has been observed that "If the power to manipulate the United Nations for its own designs passes to the Soviet Union, or if the organization is rendered impotent by the structural

change which Mr. Khrushchev has demanded, it is indeed 'done for' as a functioning agency of world collaboration."¹

The Soviet plan to substitute a three-headed executive for the Secretary General will presumably be brought up during the coming session of the Assembly. Little support for the plan has materialized outside the Communist bloc, and the necessary Charter amendment to put it into effect could be stopped by withholding of the required consent of the Western powers. But the resulting reinforcement of Soviet hostility would doubtless make it more difficult for the United Nations to operate effectively. Whether other reorganization proposals, scheduled for consideration at this year's Assembly session, would, if accepted, lessen that hostility is doubtful. The conclusion hardly can be avoided that the future usefulness, if not the continued existence, of the United Nations rests on the outcome of the present clash between two sharply opposed concepts of world organization.

DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION

Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld pointed out on Aug. 24, in the introduction to his annual report, that the controversy over organization of the Secretariat reflected the differences between these two concepts. "Certain nations [mainly members of the Soviet bloc] conceive of the organization as a static conference machinery for resolving conflicts of interest and ideologies with a view to peaceful coexistence." Other members, the Secretary General noted, view the United Nations as a "dynamic instrument" through which to seek settlement of their differences "in a spirit of objectivity."

The first concept can refer to history and to the traditions of national policies of the past. The second can point to the needs of the present day and of the future in a world of ever-closer international interdependence where nations have at their disposal armaments of hitherto unknown destructive strength. The first one is firmly anchored in the time-honored philosophy of sovereign national states in armed competition, of which the most that may be expected in the international field is that they achieve a peaceful coexistence. The second envisages possibilities of intergovernmental action overriding such a philosophy and opens the road toward more developed and increasingly effective forms of constructive international cooperation.

If the United Nations were to be regarded merely as a

¹ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "U.N. on Trial," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1961, p. 388.

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standing diplomatic conference, Hammarskjold observed, it would not need the services of a Secretariat of international civil servants. But those who take a different view of the world organization "cannot be satisfied with anything less than a Secretariat of an exclusively international character," as in fact the U.N. Charter provides. William R. Frye, U.N. correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, had described the conflicting attitudes on the Secretariat as follows in his syndicated column on July 2:

The Western view, which is also Mr. Hammarskjold's view, is that the Secretariat should be a truly international body . . . free of national and ideological pressures, working for the whole world community impartially. The Soviet view, shared by a disturbing number of neutralist countries, . . . is that on the contrary it is, or should be, an organ representative of the various political trends in the world, with personnel who serve the interests of the governments and the ideologies they represent.

Soviet opposition to Secretary General Hammarskjold stems in part from the Communist belief that there are no "neutral men" who can be relied upon to serve all nations in an impartial manner.² It is Hammarskjold's belief that while there may be no truly neutral men, "there is, if you have integrity, neutral action by the right kind of man."

SOVIET DEMAND FOR A THREE-HEADED EXECUTIVE

The Secretary General's handling of U.N. operations in the Congo, which contributed to thwarting Communist attempts to gain control of the fledgling African nation, precipitated Khrushchev's campaign to abolish the post of Secretary General.³ Appearing before the General Assembly last Sept. 23, the Soviet Premier declared: "Partiality in the implementation of practical measures on the part of the United Nations was particularly manifested in the events that flared up in the Congo. Mr. Hammarskjold, . . . in implementing the decisions of the Security Council, in effect sided with the colonialists and with the countries that support the colonialists."

It is expedient [Khrushchev went on] to renounce the system under which all the practical work in the period between General

² As early as 1920, the late Maxim Litvinov ruled out the possibility that a world security organization could span the differences between the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds because, as he put it, "Only an angel could be unbiased in judging Soviet affairs."

³ See "Russia and United Nations," *E.R.R.*, 1961 Vol. I, pp. 225-229 and 237-241.

Assembly sessions and Security Council meetings is determined by the Secretary General alone. The executive body of the United Nations should reflect the actual situation that obtains in the world today. The United Nations includes states parties to the military blocs of the Western powers, Socialist states and neutralist countries. . . . We consider it reasonable and just for the executive body of the United Nations to be constituted not as one person—the Secretary General—but as three representatives of the states belonging to the three above-mentioned groups. . . . A definite guarantee would thereby be created that the work of the United Nations executive would not be conducted to the detriment of any of these groups of states.⁴

Taking the floor of the General Assembly again, Oct. 3, Khrushchev said bluntly: "We do not trust Mr. Hammarskjöld and cannot trust him." He thereupon called on the Secretary General to resign. Hammarskjöld asserted in reply that "By resigning I would . . . at the present difficult and dangerous juncture throw the organization to the winds"; it is not the great powers that need the United Nations for protection "but all the others." Adoption of the Soviet plan of organization, the Secretary General subsequently warned, "might well prove to be the Munich of international cooperation." Finally, Feb. 14, Moscow declared that it would no longer recognize Hammarskjöld as Secretary General.⁵

Although Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders have repeatedly reiterated the demand for a U.N. executive triumvirate, they never have indicated how they would expect it to operate. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of *Foreign Affairs*, asked last spring:

Would each of the three members have the right to veto every U.N. operation? Or would whichever of the two more powerful members recruited the unaligned member thereby attain majority control? One can see a situation developing in which the neutralist representative, wavering between the arguments of the other two (and perhaps their promises and threats) would delay any decision until an emergency had developed into a catastrophe. . . . Soviet control in the proposed triumvirate might be equivalent to a veto in the Assembly.⁶

Representatives of 25 non-aligned countries, meeting recently at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, withheld direct support of

⁴ The Soviet theory of three-headed control, proposed for other international bodies as well as the United Nations, has come to be known as the "troika doctrine." A troika is a Russian vehicle drawn by three horses.

⁵ It had been announced, Feb. 13, that the deposed pro-Soviet Congolese premier, Patrice Lumumba, had been killed after escaping from imprisonment in Katanga Province. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said, March 21, that "We cannot reconcile ourselves with the fact that a prominent post in the United Nations is held by a man [Hammarskjöld] who has sullied himself by this murder."

⁶ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "U.N. on Trial," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1961, p. 390.

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the plan that would give neutralist nations a key role in administration of the United Nations. They did come out, however, for a reorganization that would give weight to regional representation, which in effect would mean neutralist representation. The final declaration of the conference, issued Sept. 6, said: "The unity of the world organization and the assuring of the efficiency of its work make it absolutely necessary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the United Nations, bearing in mind the equitable regional distribution."

RED BOYCOTT OF LIE; CHOICE OF HAMMARSKJOLD, 1953

Whatever the outcome of the Soviet campaign to reorganize the Secretariat, it appears certain that Hammarskjold's days in office are numbered. Since the Secretary General can be appointed by the General Assembly only on recommendation of the Security Council, where the Soviet Union has the privilege of veto, it is highly unlikely that Hammarskjold will be named to succeed himself when his present term expires in April 1963. It is conceivable, moreover, that he will find it expedient to resign before the end of his term, as did his predecessor, Trygve Lie.

Renewal of Lie's initial term, which was due to expire early in 1951, ran into a Soviet veto as a result of his support of U.N. intervention in the Korean War. However, when the United States insisted on his retention as a matter of principle, the General Assembly, which had fixed the length of the Secretary General's term in the first place, extended Lie's original term for three years from Feb. 2, 1951. All countries of the Soviet bloc refused to deal with him directly after that date, and on Nov. 10, 1952, he resigned on the ground that the Soviet boycott made it impossible for him to work effectively for peace in Korea. Lie remained in office until April 10, 1953, when Hammarskjold's first term began.

Hammarskjold was a compromise choice, recommended by the Security Council only after a prolonged deadlock in the course of which several Soviet-favored candidates failed to win the required number of votes and the name of Lester B. Pearson of Canada was vetoed by the Soviet Union.⁷ Agreement on a successor to Hammarskjold, when the time comes, is apt to be equally difficult. Even if the choice lies among Asians or Africans, as has been gener-

⁷ See "Russia and United Nations," *E.R.R.*, 1961 Vol. I, pp. 229-230.

ally expected, the problem of finding a man satisfactory to Moscow as well as to the free world may be as hard to resolve as it was after the Russians fell out with the first Secretary General.

ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS; HAMMARSKJOLD'S VIEWS

The Soviet plan to replace the Secretary General by a three-man executive was intended in part to please the uncommitted nations, particularly those which might hope to supply the third member of the triumvirate. In this respect the proposal has met with some success. Three members of an eight-nation Committee of Experts on the Review of the Activities and Organization of the Secretariat recommended,⁸ June 25, that three deputy secretaries general be appointed. The experts from Ghana, India and the United Arab Republic proposed that each of the deputy secretaries take over responsibility for the performance of duties in a specified field. They did not say that each should represent one of the three ideological groups named by Khrushchev, but this was implied by the statement that their selection should take into account "the main political trends in the world today."⁹

A majority of the eight experts recommended revision of the system of recruiting professional personnel for the Secretariat. At present, these posts, numbering about 1,400, are allocated among member states under the formula used for allocation of regular U.N. expenditures, so that the number of jobs to which a member is entitled corresponds roughly to that member's contribution to support of the United Nations.¹⁰ Under the experts' plan, each nation would have a minimum of two staff members; thereafter, one staff member would be recruited for each 10 million of a country's population up to 150 million, and an additional staff member for each 30 million in excess of that figure; the remainder of the available posts (about 1,000) would be apportioned in accordance with budget

⁸ *Review of the Activities and Organization of the Secretariat.* The eight nations represented on the committee were Colombia, France, Ghana, Great Britain, India, Soviet Union, United Arab Republic and United States.

⁹ The committee report included separate statements by the American, British, Colombian and Soviet experts, all of whom took exception to the above proposal. The Soviet member endorsed Khrushchev's plan for an executive triumvirate; the American and Colombian experts warned against infringing on the Secretary General's responsibilities; the British member asserted that the Secretary General and his staff must continue to be "a truly international body."

¹⁰ In practice, a country's quota may go unfilled for lack of qualified applicants or for other reasons, with the result that other member states become over-represented on the Secretariat. See "Russia and United Nations," *E.R.R.*, 1961 Vol. I, pp. 238-240.

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assessments. This formula would give the nations of Western Europe and North America fewer Secretariat posts than at present, with the nations of Eastern Europe and Africa entitled to additional posts. Quotas for Asian and Latin American members would be about the same.

In a report on July 3, Hammarskjöld opposed the plan for appointment of three deputy secretaries general.

The Secretary General [he said] does not take up for consideration proposals which would *either*, directly or indirectly, infringe upon the responsibilities of the Secretary General, as established in the Charter, *or*, contrary to the Charter, introduce the notion that members of the Secretariat are representatives, in the work of the organization, of the governments of their home countries or of the ideologies or policies to which these countries may be considered to adhere. Such proposals would assume a fundamental change of the character of the organization, requiring a Charter revision.

Hammarskjöld objected also to a proposal of the Soviet expert that Secretariat posts be divided equally among "Socialist states, neutralist states and states members of Western military alliances." The Secretary General observed that "Many of the states included in one or the other category may not wish to be thus labeled." On the other hand, he agreed that the Secretariat, especially at the top level, "should be progressively adapted to a changing membership." To attain this goal, he recommended appointment of five assistant secretaries general who would be responsible for advising the Secretary General on political problems, and nine under secretaries, who would handle administrative affairs of a non-political nature. "Within this framework," Hammarskjöld commented, "there will be full opportunity for geographical distribution on an equitable basis of the seven main geographical areas of the world,¹¹ including . . . at least one from each of the permanent members of the Security Council." He emphasized that the duties of the proposed assistant secretaries would be advisory only, for the "organization of the work of the Secretariat is the exclusive responsibility of the Secretary General."

PLEA FOR CONFERENCE TO SIFT CHARTER CHANGES

Sen. Joseph S. Clark (D Pa.) and 27 co-sponsors introduced a concurrent resolution in the U.S. Senate on Aug. 3

¹¹ Africa, Asia and the Far East, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, North America.

calling for a United Nations Charter review conference. The purpose of the resolution, Clark said, was to "show that there is strong Senate support for a U.S. initiative this fall to strengthen the United Nations authority to prevent war as the best answer to the Soviet efforts to weaken, if not to wreck, the United Nations." The senator listed 10 areas of revision which, in his opinion, might be considered by the proposed conference. He described as "an important defect" the lack of a permanent seat on the Security Council for Latin America, Africa or Southeast Asia, and he suggested that the conference might "give some consideration as to whether or not a new Charter should not provide for a unicameral body, instead of a bicameral body, as at present." Voting procedures were cited as being in need of reform. The present method of allotting one vote in the General Assembly to each member nation, Clark pointed out, makes it theoretically possible for the 50 least populous nations, with 200 million inhabitants, to outvote the 49 most populous nations, with 1.8 billion inhabitants.

The U.N. Charter provides that a review conference may be held at a place and date agreed to by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and any seven members of the Security Council. "If such a conference has not been held before the tenth [1955] annual session of the General Assembly," the Charter stated, "... the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session." Under a resolution adopted in 1955, it was decided in principle to hold a Charter review conference. An arrangements committee, on which all U.N. members were represented, was appointed to work out procedural details. Poland and the Soviet Union immediately announced that their delegations would not take part in any Charter review discussions. The committee, which has twice reported to the Assembly without any action having been taken, is under instruction to report again during the forthcoming session. It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union, in light of its campaign for reorganization of the Secretariat, will now reverse its position and agree to participate in a conference.

Any prospect of amending the Charter in important respects is not bright even if a conference is held. Amendments must be approved by two-thirds of all United Nations members, including all of the five which hold perma-

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nent seats on the Security Council. Any one of the five thus has power to bar any change in the Charter. Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared, July 14, that the United States "would not consent" to the Soviet plan for a three-headed U.N. executive. The Soviet Union in turn might be expected to block Charter amendments favored by the Western powers.

Changes in United Nations Since 1945

THE DIFFICULTY of amending the Charter has led to various steps or proposals aimed to effect by other means changes that practical considerations seemed to require. Abuse of the veto power has been the motivating influence in more than one such case. The framers of the Charter viewed the veto as an ultimate safeguard that would be invoked only on rare occasions. The Soviet Union soon demonstrated that that was a mistaken assumption. It exercised the veto power nine times in the Security Council's first year (1946), and since then it has run the total of Soviet vetoes up to 99.

Amendment of the Charter to eliminate the veto privilege was proposed, by Cuba, as early as the summer of 1946. Australia in the same year suggested the possibility of so interpreting Security Council voting provisions as to narrow the scope of decisions subject to veto. A resolution approved by the General Assembly in April 1949 recommended that the Security Council classify decisions on 35 specified types of questions as procedural and therefore not subject to veto. But neither this nor other attempts to persuade the Council to limit the range of decisions subject to veto were successful.

Efforts to limit use of the so-called "double veto," by which a permanent member of the Security Council has power to veto a motion to classify a proposal as procedural and then to veto the proposal itself, have been scarcely more successful. On one occasion, however, the Council president refused to recognize as a veto the Soviet Union's negative vote on a motion classifying as procedural a resolution to set up a fact-finding committee to investigate a

complaint by Laos of aggression by North Viet Nam. The Soviet representative insisted that the question was "eminently substantive," but his protest at the president's contrary ruling on Sept. 7, 1959, did not prevail.

SHIFTING OF POWER FROM COUNCIL TO ASSEMBLY

Failure of attempts to put general restrictions on exercise of the veto power in the Security Council has had the practical effect of making the General Assembly the more important of the two U.N. legislative bodies. The Charter had assigned to the Council primary responsibility for maintaining peace on the assumption that the five permanent members—United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, (Nationalist) China—would act in concert to preserve world order. But Russia's free resort to the veto crippled the Council's ability to discharge that duty effectively. The consequent threat to collective security became clearly apparent at the end of June 1950, when only the absence of the Soviet representative enabled the Security Council to put through resolutions setting in motion U.N. action to resist Communist aggression in Korea.¹²

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, addressing the General Assembly on Sept. 20, 1950, declared that it could and should "organize itself to discharge its responsibility promptly and decisively if the Security Council is prevented from acting." Adoption of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution followed on Nov. 3, 1950. The resolution provided that if the Security Council should be unable to exercise its responsibility to maintain peace, because deadlocked by the veto, the General Assembly might be called into emergency session on 24 hours' notice to recommend (but not to order) appropriate collective action. The new peace machinery has been utilized four times since 1950, most recently with respect to the Congo a year ago.¹³ The Assembly on Sept. 20 adopted, 70-0,¹⁴ an Afro-Asian resolution calling on the Secretary General to "continue to take vigorous action" in the Congo under resolutions adopted by the Security Council in July and August. Khrushchev's attack on the Secretary General came three days later.

Although the Charter had given the General Assembly authority to consider and make recommendations relating

¹² See "United Nations: 1945-1960," *E.R.R.*, 1960 Vol. I, pp. 453-454.

¹³ The "Uniting for Peace" resolution was invoked twice in 1956, over Suez and Hungary, and in 1958 on complaints by Lebanon and Jordan of interference in their affairs by the United Arab Republic.

¹⁴ France, the Union of South Africa and the Soviet bloc countries abstained.

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to international peace and security, so long as the particular question was not currently before the Security Council, it was the Council that was expected to take decisive action. Adoption of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution in effect transferred that function to the General Assembly in cases where the Council found itself unable to act. The Assembly can do no more than make recommendations but it is not fettered by a veto and its recommendations, when approved by large majorities, are apt to have behind them the force of world public opinion.

GROWTH OF MEMBERSHIP; NEW VOTING PATTERNS

As recently as six years ago, voting in the General Assembly usually followed a simple East versus West pattern, the Soviet bloc lining up on one side of a question and the Western nations on the other. Since 1955, however, an influential new Afro-Asian bloc—the neutralist bloc referred to by Khrushchev—has emerged as a third force in the United Nations. Forty nations, 23 of them in Africa, have been admitted to the world organization in the past six years, increasing the Afro-Asian membership to 46—only four short of a General Assembly majority. With at least 12 more African countries scheduled to become independent in the near future, the day is not far off when the Afro-Asian group will be in position to control well over one-half of the votes in the Assembly.

Conflicts are apt to develop among Afro-Asian states, as among Western nations, to prevent a consistently united voting front. However, on matters of direct concern to some or all of them, such as economic aid, colonialism and race relations, their action may be decisive. Thirty-five of the 46 Afro-Asian members, for example, joined in the call for the recent special Assembly session on the Franco-Tunisian dispute over Bizerte. One of the delegates whose name appeared on the letter of request said most of the signatories had no desire for the session, but that since Tunisia had raised the charge of colonialist aggression, they felt obliged to support her. Even so, 10 members that had been French colonies in Africa refused to sign the petition.¹⁵

On issues in which their own aspirations are not at

¹⁵ Japan, the forty-sixth member of the Afro-Asian group, also declined to sign.

stake, the Afro-Asian nations frequently are subject to pressure from the Western and Communist blocs. Maneuvering for votes has come to be as lively in the Assembly as in any national legislative chamber. Sam Pope Brewer, writing in the *New York Times* on Aug. 13, commented: "In all the interplay of groups the United States is possibly the unhappiest member. In some cases involving 'anti-colonialist' action, conflict arises between this country's traditionally anti-colonialist policy and its friendship for allies who are being criticized. Decisions have to be made either to offend a friend or to compromise with conscience."

A frequently voiced criticism of the Assembly, recently reiterated by Sen. Clark, concerns discrepancies between the voting power and population of member nations. Most of the more populous states are stronger economically and militarily than the less populous and make larger financial contributions to the United Nations. However, any effort to relate voting power to population or to any combination of factors indicative of national strength would appear to be doomed. Disagreements would inevitably arise in choosing the criteria for a system of weighted voting, and the smaller states would fight any plan to diminish their voting power.

Newly aware of their strength in the General Assembly, the Afro-Asian nations attempted at the last session to gain more seats on other key U.N. bodies. Jaja Wachuku of Nigeria, speaking for the African states, declared on Nov. 1 that "We cannot carry out our [U.N.] obligations when we are outside the door—locked out. We want to be inside." Four days later, V. K. Krishna Menon, Indian Defense Minister, called for a meeting of the "four great powers"¹⁶ to work out a formula for increased representation for Africa and Asia.

A group of Latin American nations, supported by the Afro-Asian bloc, then introduced two resolutions which would have enlarged the Security Council from 11 to 13 members and the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 24 members. In this way, it was hoped, African and Asian states could be given more council seats without depriving other nations of representation. The Soviet Union declared, however, that it would not assent to the resolu-

¹⁶ United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain and France.

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tion—which would require Charter amendments and thus be subject to veto¹⁷—until Communist China was given U.N. representation. The recent Belgrade conference of non-aligned nations urged Charter revision to expand the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. Its final declaration recorded the recommendation of conference participants recognizing Red China that representatives of that nation be accepted as “the only legitimate representatives of [China] in the United Nations.”

BROADENING OF ROLE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

The diplomatic role of the Secretary General has assumed greater importance over the years than the framers of the Charter expected. The Secretary General was described in the Charter as the “chief administrative officer” of the United Nations, and he was given the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion threatened the maintenance of peace and security. But in some situations the Secretary General, acting on his own initiative or serving as the agent of the Security Council or the General Assembly in carrying out resolutions of those bodies, has pretty much charted his own course in matters of high policy.

Trygve Lie considered that he was entitled to suggest methods of solving international problems, but his intervention in highly controversial issues aroused antagonisms which led eventually to his resignation. Hammarskjold, on occasion, has adopted an even bolder course. In the Lebanon crisis of 1958, when the Security Council could not agree on a plan of action, he declared: “The Secretary General should . . . be expected to act without any guidance from the Assembly or the Security Council should this appear to him necessary.” Hammarskjold’s activity in the Congo crisis earned him the resentment of the Soviet Union, but he retained the support of most of the neutralist bloc. Support from that quarter enabled him to follow a more independent path than his predecessor was able to follow in matters involving the great powers. Edmund K. Faltermayer, writing in the *Wall Street Journal* on March 31, observed:

Mr. Lie . . . was forced by circumstances to take a position that definitely was pro-Western and anti-Communist. Mr. Hammar-

¹⁷ The Covenant of the League of Nations empowered the Council, with majority assent of the Assembly, to increase the number of both permanent and non-permanent Council members.

skjold, by contrast, has been able to avoid a direct identification with the West—or the Russians, for that matter—in the U.N. Congo operations. Before making any major moves he has consulted carefully with the U.N.'s 18-member committee of nations, predominantly African and Asian lands, that have provided troops for the Congo. By bringing the Afro-Asian bloc into active guidance of the U.N.'s part in the Congo, Mr. Hammarskjold has made it much more difficult for the Soviet to effectively oppose him.

The Secretary General has become adept at another type of diplomacy. The prestige and resources of his office, and his personal skill in negotiation, have been frequently invoked in efforts to obtain compliance with U.N. resolutions. Examples include Hammarskjold's mission to Peking in 1954 to seek release of captured personnel of the U.N. Korean Command; his efforts since 1956 to ensure enforcement of general armistice agreements in the Middle East; and his performance of assigned tasks having to do with the Hungarian revolt in 1956, with South West Africa in 1957, and with South Africa in 1960.

In all his diplomatic endeavors, Hammarskjold has not hesitated to take action that might offend one or all parties to a dispute. The international civil servant, in his view, may seek guidance both from "case law" and through consultation; he must, like any judge, consciously keep his personal sympathies from influencing his actions. But in the end, "if integrity in the sense of respect for law and respect for truth were to drive him into positions of conflict with this or that interest, then that conflict is a sign of his neutrality and not of his failure to observe neutrality."¹⁸

¹⁸ Address at Oxford University, England, May 30, 1961.

Question of Representation of China

THE UNITED STATES continues to oppose admission of Communist China to the United Nations, but it can no longer count on mustering enough votes in the General Assembly to prevent consideration of the issue. Over the years the margin against debating the question there has grown steadily smaller as the number of U.N. members has increased. On Oct. 8, 1960, for the first time, the customary American-sponsored resolution to postpone debate was carried by less than a majority of the whole membership. The division was 42-34, with 22 nations abstaining. However, three nations that sided with the United States last year—Brazil, Canada, Great Britain—have since announced that they will vote to take up the question this year. Several of the abstaining nations—most of them African—are expected to do the same.

The United States reportedly has devised a new strategy to be applied at the coming Assembly session. Instead of moving to block debate on seating Red China, as it has done every year since 1950, the American delegation may be among those proposing discussion. Once debate is under way, however, the United States can be expected to pursue vigorously its traditional objective of denying representation to Communist China while defending the membership rights of the Nationalist Chinese regime of Chiang Kai-shek.

The whole question is complicated by uncertainty as to whether it should be handled as an application for membership, requiring recommendation of the Security Council and admission by vote of the General Assembly, or as a question of determining who holds valid credentials to represent China. In that sense the problem is unprecedented, and expert studies have not yet produced any generally accepted guides to its solution.¹⁹

Many of the neutral states are known to have been irritated by American opposition to Red China's admission. In their opinion the United States is using the United Nations to further foreign policy objectives in the Far East, and they argue that if Americans make the organization an instrument of cold war strategy, no one can blame the

¹⁹ See "Representation in United Nations," *E.R.R.*, 1960 Vol. II, pp. 711-714.

Soviets for doing the same. Moreover, the Soviet threat to block any proposal to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council until Red China has been admitted may exert strong influence on neutralist voting. Still another consideration—fear of the Peking regime as a potential aggressor—may give Red China the support of several Asian states which would like to have the United Nations keep a close watch on the Chinese Communists.

The American case against Communist China is based on the argument that the Peking regime does not meet the "peace-loving" standard set forth in the Charter. "They [the Communist Chinese] practice aggression; they preach violence; and they are openly contemptuous" of the United Nations, U.S. Delegate James J. Wadsworth said in the General Assembly last year. Furthermore, the Peking government still stands condemned as an aggressor in the Korean War under a General Assembly resolution adopted in 1951. Advocates of U.N. representation for Red China, while conceding the truth of the American charges, nevertheless assert that it is unrealistic to deny representation to a regime that has governed the world's most populous nation for 12 years. Since the chief value of the United Nations today is as an international forum, it is argued that the organization must necessarily be handicapped in its functions as long as Communist China, with more than 600 million inhabitants, is absent.

COMPLICATIONS OVER MAURITANIA-MONGOLIA PLAN

Further complicating the Communist China seating question is the issue of United Nations membership for Outer Mongolia and the new African state of Mauritania. The Soviet Union announced last spring that it would block Mauritania's entry unless Outer Mongolia were admitted at the same time.²⁰ Nationalist China in turn has threatened to veto Outer Mongolia's application in the Security Council. Moscow's hope is that nations of the French Community in Africa, of which Mauritania is one, would retaliate by going on record in the General Assembly for seating Communist China.

The United States, to please the Chinese Nationalists, has dropped plans to establish diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia, but there is no indication as yet that the

²⁰ This "package deal" procedure has been used before. On Dec. 14, 1955, 16 nations were admitted, including pro-Communist and pro-Western states whose applications had been turned down when presented singly.

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Formosa regime will yield to American pressure to abstain from voting when the question of admitting Outer Mongolia comes up in the Security Council. Without a negative Council vote, both Outer Mongolia and Mauritania would be admitted by vote of the General Assembly. In return, the United States would expect the support of the French African Community in opposition to seating of the Peking regime.

OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSED TWO-CHINA SOLUTION

Many U.N. members view the so-called two-China policy as a possible compromise solution of the problem of Chinese representation. Under this plan, China's membership in the United Nations would be transferred from the Nationalist government on Formosa to the Communist regime in Peking; the Nationalists would then be readmitted as representatives of the "Republic of Formosa." Variations of the two-China policy have been advocated in the past by three of President Kennedy's foreign policy advisers—former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles, and Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai E. Stevenson. The President, however, ruled out this approach when he said on Aug. 2²¹ that the United States would support "continued representation of the Republic of China in the United Nations" and would continue to oppose admission of the Communist regime.²²

The major obstacle to carrying out a two-China policy is the attitude of the two Chinese governments, each of which claims to represent all of China, meaning both Formosa and the mainland. The Nationalists have said repeatedly that they will withdraw from the United Nations if their Communist rivals are seated; the Communists likewise have declared that they will not accept United Nations membership so long as the Nationalists are represented.

²¹ In joint communique with Nationalist Chinese Premier Chen Cheng.

²² On July 28 the Senate adopted, 76-0, a joint resolution stating that it was the sense of Congress that the United States should continue to support the Nationalist government as the representative of China and continue to oppose seating of the Communist regime. The House concurred, 395-0, on Aug. 31.



